In the Australian state of New South Wales judges have sat under the coat of arms of the British monarchy since the nineteenth century (figure 1). Having been accustomed to seeing this symbol over the course of many years doing research in New South Wales courtrooms I was surprised to notice, during some research into the physical form of courts in 2000, that a different coat of arms had appeared above the bench in a new court building. This was the State arms of New South Wales. This change had been officially introduced into new courtrooms by an executive decision in 1995, in the midst of a controversy over Australian republicanism and allegiance to the British monarchy. Further developments saw a bill supporting the use of the State arms introduced into the New South Wales Parliament in 2002, and the whole matter referred to a parliamentary committee which took public submissions on the subject and reported in December 2002.
These events provide the cultural background and framework within which I interpret the meanings of these contested coats of arms. Coming across these contemporary contests over coats of arms in a short space of time, I became interested in the meaning of these ancient and obscure symbols. They offer the possibility of investigating the ways in which meanings change over time. This investigation in turn suggests some insights into the relationship between signs, their objects and their interpretive context. Coats of arms have the quality that they endure over long periods of time, as a result both of their formalised specificity and their material existence. While the sign remains (physically) the same, the context in which it is interpreted and hence its meaning can change.
The process of interpreting a sign may be understood through the context of meanings by which a sign is connected with various other cultural manifestations. The changing cultural, social and political context refigures the the meaning which we attribute to a sign. In other words, its meaning depends on the associations, cultural contexts and broader meaning frameworks by which we interpret it. Some of these contexts derive from referents to other words, symbols and objects. In the case of heraldic symbols these may be well documented, if not widely understood. For instance, the harp on the British coat of arms refers to Ireland, by long historical association.
In the pragmatic semiotic tradition signs can also be understood by their effects. Following Peirce, Eco observes that we may best understand a military command by observing how the troops respond to it (Eco 1976a) . Likewise, we can find valuable clues to the social role of signs by considering the uses to which they are put. The process of connecting the sign to various other meanings is a complex semiosis which may expand infinitely.
1 Since this cultural context changes over time and between cultures, situations where meanings change or are contested are particularly instructive for semiotic research. The following discussion examines the changed and contested meanings surrounding some unchanging physical symbols. Their meaning is considered from the point of view of their cultural referents, including both antecedent associations and actual or intended effects.
The cultural specificity and political salience of these interpretants draws attention to the social dimension of interpretive communities. projects. The meaning of coats of arms may be understood by their history, by the political contests to which they are enlisted, and by their impacts within particular social settings. To the extent that there is a hiatus between the ancient referents of coats of arms and their contemporary political and social roles, it is possible to investigate the part played by obscurity and endurance in their interpretation.
Lost traditions
To try to 'read' any of these coats of arms in a literal sense leads to several difficulties. We find their languages-visual or verbal-obscure. What are we to make of these lions and kangaroos; of old French and Latin mottos? Even if we understand the words, some of the mottos seem to make little sense, and convey no sense of the power they wield or any apparent meaning of the symbols. A natural response to this obscurity is to try to understand the interpretive framework of the time and mentality which created them. There are cues to this and it is possible to discover quite a lot of their original referents, some of which are considered below. I also inquire into the shifts of meaning which they same symbol can undergo in moving to a new context in time and in place. However, the conflicts and polemics over these symbols suggest that they may be viewed at another level.
Political projects
The polemics associated with these coats of arms, and the alternative versions discussed, indicate that people are identifying these symbols with particular causes. As the State coat of arms is enlisted in support of a republican campaign, the British coat of arms is seen as royalist. Despite their sometimes obscure and ancient symbolism, they have meanings of another type. These cannot be read by simply delving into the historical origins, but must be deduced from the contemporary contexts in which the symbols appear, and from the disputes which they represent.
These disputes are about sovereignty, allegiance, and ethnic identity. In This bill, he said, was intended 'to make a number of symbolic changes to remove some of the obvious and significant references to the Crown in State legislation and administration.' 5 Accused by opponents of representing 'republicanism by stealth', the bill was defeated in the Parliament. The most interesting source of considerations regarding the appropriate symbol of the court's authority can be found in the Solicitor General's advice.
Taking issue with arguments in favour of the Royal coat of arms in other documents, the Solicitor General, Keith Mason (1995) made several points in support of its replacement:
• the historical and outdated nature of references to the State's "British heritage";
• • the provision of the 1986 Act that "unless Her Majesty is personally present in New South Wales, Her powers and functions are exercised by the Governor, on the advice of the Premier";
In response to a view that the Royal coat of arms signified the independence of the judiciary and the separation of powers, the Solicitor General concluded, "The judiciary is indeed an independent and separate arm of government. But it is nevertheless an arm of government of New South Wales." (Mason 1995, 5-6) This is a succinct statement of the social, legal and political sources of judicial authority: it is to be in line with our culture and heritage; it represents the source of laws and the executive power which enforces them; and it is represented as an arm of that same government, while being independent of it. 
The power of the object
Why is it that coats of arms, as physical objects of ancient origin, come to be associated with sovereignty and state jurisdiction? Do they bring any additional authority to the government, court or political project which they represent?
Apart from the traditional symbolism of these objects, their physical presence in places of power suggests they may play other roles. Having considered, above, some of the historical associations of these symbols, and their enlistment in political projects, I now turn to another aspect of the effects of these symbols.
It appears that in New South Wales court rooms the physical presence of coats of arms invokes authority. The coat of arms is always displayed above the judge or magistrate. In older courts this was often on a canopy which projected out from the wall above the judge (as seen in figure 1 ). In newer courts it is usually on the wall behind the judge so it is seen above his or her head from the The submission was written on letterhead bearing the New South Wales coat of arms.
In furnishing every court with one or the other coat of arms above the judge it is clear that interchangeable symbols are made to do the job of invoking 13 Level 5, Downing Centre, Castlereagh Street.
the authority of the court. Whether the symbol is the Royal or State coat of arms, and however it is interpreted, it takes the same place and is seen to be indispensable to the exercise of judicial power.
How is it that the coat of arms, whether that of the British monarch or that of the State of New South Wales, acquires this power? What is apparent about the coat of arms is its presence, whatever it represents. In the spatially loaded but iconographically sparse New South Wales courtroom the coat of arms is powerfully conspicuous, simply by being there: there, above the judge's head.
The use of a particular symbol is decided by practice, or occasionally by some controversy, and continues by custom. As a physical object, the coat of arms is an enduring presence over time. It appears that a physical object conveys messages rather differently to other signs, particularly verbal ones.
Some of these differences may be observed by comparing the ways in is not an event enacted at a specific point in time like the swearing of an oath.
Gagliardi has suggested that these are characteristics comon to physical objects.
The possibility that artefacts evade censorship depends on two intrinsic features present in different measure in the various artefacts: the tendency, proper to matter, to endure over time -something not always easy to manipulate -and the characteristic they have of being "ornament", of being "innocent forms", apparently without influence on the "important things" which are said and done. (Gagliardi 1990, 26-7) The persistence of the Royal coat of arms in most New South Wales courts is an example of this endurance over time. The decision to change to the State coat of arms was made relatively easily-they were more "innocent" than the wording of an oath-but the objects will last for many decades. Hence, as Pasquale
Gagliardi points out, physical objects have qualities of innocence as well as endurance. Their innocence, in his terms, derives from their lack of explicit influence on important utterances and actions. This in turn derives from the facts that objects are inert (and thus not active) and their meanings are inexplicit, or at less amenable to exegesis than texts. The meaning of the coat of arms is all the more obscure through its tangential reference to ancient interpretants. A judicial oath of allegiance to the Queen is more explicit than a coat of arms in the court room because it uses the English language to pledge that allegiance. It is more immediate since it is spoken in the here and now-in "real time"-it is a current commitment rather than an enduring presence. Apparently the coat of arms as a physical object acquires power from both these qualities, of endurance and of obscurity.
Obscurity
Australian lawyers commonly believe that the obscurity of the symbols of the common law adds to their mystique and to the authority which they wield. This viewpoint was illustrated in my earlier discussion of the magistrate who believed that an Aboriginal child was suitably impressed by the coat of arms. Lawyers of a more modern or critical persuasion find these arcane ancient symbols, including the wigs and gowns of many Australian judges and barristers, to be an embarrassment: the law should be expressed in plain English and lawyers should dress like anyone else. Even a distinguished Aboriginal leader, Mum Shirl (1995, 121) , invited to the Prime Minister's Lodge, was turned away by this symbol of authority.
I looked around the outside a bit; it was a big and fancy place, and I was curious about it. When I walked in, though, there was this big coat of arms and it didn't feel like a house at all, so I just turned around and walked right back out of there. This suggests that these symbols may be effective in impressing those who are expected to submit to imperial or judicial power. There is also evidence that the powerful believe they are effective. The Solicitor General's advice and the political debate which formed its context discussed the referent of the symbols, i.e. the British monarch or the State government, which I considered above.
What was left out of his discussion, indeed of any of the debate around which coat of arms should be used in New South Wales courts, is the seeming The secret gives one a position of exception…. It is basically independent of the content it guards. … From secrecy, which shades all that is profound and significant, grows the typical error according to which everything mysterious is something important and essential. (Simmel 1950, 332-3) Eco uses other parts of this passage in his attack on Hermetic interpretation, ie overinterpretation. (Eco et al. 1992, 38) It seems to me that this misses Simmel's point, which is not that obscure symbols may suffer an excess of interpretation, but rather that they gain a certain form of social power through a paucity of interpretants, which leads the powerless to doubt their ability to interpret them.
Interpretations may be part of a political project, particularly one which seeks to capture the power of a traditional or ancient symbol and to invest it with new meanings. However, the obscurity of ancient objects, symbols and languages may also gain political power through their lack of contemporary interpretants, and hence their obscurity.
While competing factions of Anglophiles and republicans have recently fought out their causes under the banners of the Royal and the State coats of arms, as symbols of judicial power these symbols have another purchase on political symbolism. Signifying power itself, in ways which appear ancient and obscure to the majority of people, the coats of arms continue to exist as signs. But, as signs which are interpreted through the gaps in their referents rather than through some transparent interpretive pathway, they are signs of themselves, signs of their own power.
Endurance
If the efficacy of physical symbols in invoking authority derives from their obscurity, as Simmel suggests of the secret, the analysis of ancient heraldic traditions and ooof dead languages indicate that obscurity in turn derives from the longevity of objects. Endurance has other effects which are not directly related to obscurity, but rather to physical presence itself.
In discussing the difference between the verbal oath and the physical coat of arms I pointed out that the former is only uttered in real time, while the latter persists. This is also a function of human agency. The oath must be uttered by a person; it is their commitment to allegiance. It is a performative like the judicial decision. The human agent who carved or painted the coat of arms, or the one who fixed it to the wall of the courtroom, may be long gone from that place, yet the sign remains. It is not apparent who made it or who put it there. In this way it acquires a semiotic power which is not linked to any individual sign-maker.
The impersonal object manifests that basic aporia of jurisprudence, the rule of law and not of men. Should we then conclude that the coat of arms has the effect of masking human agency? If the judge pronounces judgment only in the presence of this obscure and ancient object, it appears that the object lends its impersonal and enduring authority to the performance. In identifying this authority with the state, Michael Taussig calls one of the communicative uses of signs "state fetishism", and he quotes Philip Abrams.
[T]he state is not the reality behind the mask of political practice. It is itself the mask which prevents our seeing political practice as it is. … The confusing figure of the mask is helpful only so long as, instead of trying to rip it off, we recognize and even empathize with its capacity to confuse, which means we take stock of the fact that what's important is not that it conceals but that it makes truth.
(Abrams, quoted Taussig 1992, 113) The sign's meaning is immanent in its effects. If the sign is found to constitute a social reality regardless of its associations (ancient or contemporary), we know it by its works. Where the sign is the mask which constitutes the power of the state, what does the mask conceal if it is doing this work in front of our eyes?
The symbol which constitutes state power is only a mask if it has a hidden meaning. Interpretation such as that offered by the Solicitor General sees the constitution of power in a semiotics which discovers in the State coat of arms a transcendent meaning of indivisible separation no less mysterious than the Holy Trinity: the judiciary is part of the combined power of the three arms of government, yet independent. And yet this is not what the object does in the courtroom. The object itself may mean nothing or anything: the monarch, the state or the independent judiciary. If the symbolic object means nothing beyond its invocation of power, then it is a transparent manifestation of power constituted in the here and now of each actually existing courtroom.
To say, as Taussig does, that the symbols which invoke state power are "fetishes" is to associate the modern state with the objects of "primitive" religions.
This was Marx's rhetorical move in associating the bourgeois means of production with the commodity fetish. (Mitchell 1996, 190ff) It is mirrored in the Aboriginal accusation that "these judges [and] coppers" have stolen sacred animals for their own power. I say mirrored, however, and not reproduced, because the Aboriginal protest does not try to diminish the bourgeois order by an association with "fetishism", but rather tries to reclaim the objects themselves. In the present analysis I have recognised the power of objects and tried to explain it. Used in suitably powerful social contexts, objects are equally efficacious in
Aboriginal society and in the colonising society. Indeed the parallels clarify this efficacy, without debunking or denigrating the objects or the beliefs they sustain.
I said above that consequences may flow from the interpretation of meanings. If a sign means a monarchist or a republican New South Wales we understand the content of the sign by the context in which it is used, and the polemics surrounding its use. Yet I have discussed here a case in which it seems that a sign's efficacy has become detached from its denotation of different sources of authority or allegiance. Different symbols can be used interchangeably to invoke judicial power, even though the signs may "mean" allegiance to a British Queen or a republican cause. In this situation we see that different signs may have the same effect-the invocation of judicial power-despite various different prior associations.
To return to the ways of interpreting signs with which I began this discussion, of course meaning is constituted both through cultural association and pragmatic effect. This example of symbols bearing different associations with the same effect suggests the possibility of disjuncture between the interpretive regimes of antecedent association and consequential effect. By drawing attention to the obscurity of the associations behind these signs, together with the immanence of their physical presence and invocation of power, I have tried to explore the relationship between an exegetical approach to meanings (from prior association) and a pragmatic approach (understanding their effects). Where effect can stay the same despite variations in association, this suggests that the very obscurity of those associations may be contributing to the effect.
The physical coat of arms is an object which endures over long periods and is used to invoke judicial power. Its meaning is apparent in this use. As a physical object of early provenance it not only has ancient, obscure, or ambiguous associations, but it represents the power of entities which are not present.
Whether this is the power of a monarch, of the state, or of an independent judiciary, it is not the power of the individual judge qua individual. While the judicial decision may only be pronounced by such an individual, the invariable association of this performative with the coat of arms serves to attach the immediate power of the judge to the enduring power of the object. Likewise, the enduring power of the object invokes an impersonal authority with every judicial pronouncement.
